Post by grooverider on Aug 15, 2011 1:27:29 GMT -5
For many socialists of the analytical Marxist brand, the argument against private ownership of the means of production is two fold, and they go as such (premises 1 - 2b are arguments made by Nozick, for reference purposes while 3 - 9 is Cohen's reply):
(in reply to Nozick, from Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality):
1. Nozick claims that anything acquired by just means is justly owned.
1b. There are no unjust consequences to things that follow (1).
2. Nozick goes on to say that taking something from someone who acquired said item is unjust.
2b. Private property is one such thing.
3. But (and here Cohen replies), clearly there are unlucky people who get the short end of the deal.
4. Said unlucky people are the victims of involuntary injustice.
5. In analyzing the origins of private property, then, there is no justice in how it was originally acquired.
6. When person A, for instance, has property X, he is depriving Y number of people to access to it.
7. Being deprived of access to property, something so valuable, is something clearly no reasonable person would do.
8. Therefore, person A is stealing from B number of people.
9. Private property, as opposed to collectively owned property, is therefore theft.
Now, on the surface, I think this seems to be an incredibly well thought out argument, and Nozick never replied to it. However, in practice, there seems to be problems with collective ownership of the means of production: it assumes that people will be able to get along, disregards jealously, and places too much faith into a democratic process. Or so the critics claim.
But the alternative, and (in my view) only way of justifying private ownership of the means of production, is to endorse Hobbes' approach. This approach goes, very roughly, as follows:
1. There is the state of nature that is undesirable.
2. People will fight, and only the strongest will win.
3. Since A is undeniably stronger than everyone else, everyone else will rationally allow A to do whatever he wishes in exchange for their own security.
4. Therefore, this is the origin of the "right" to private property.
But there are some problems with this account. First of all, the strongest aren't necessarily the ones owning the current property, unless the strongest is the state, in which case it is an incredibly charitable reading of Hobbes, since it isn't in the interest of the majority of the people to protect the interests of the minority. Furthermore, it doesn't explain why people don't actively seek to kill the owners of the means of the production, but rather are more focused on killing themselves. Donald Trump, or Rupert Murdoch, or the Koch brothers aren't subject to assassination attempts. Oddly enough, there is more crime among the poor, since they seem to be easier targets. This seems to paint a very grim picture of the state of things, particularly the institutions. After a while, who would stand for such a thing?
Yet, I can't help but think that this is a very strong argument, though not necessarily philosophically sound. At the very least, even Nozick wouldn't agree to this, since he takes (his) Kantian approach. But philosophy cannot just be an exercise in logic, but also have practical consequences. The alternative seems to be to put more faith in collective deliberation, which some may say is incredibly naive.
...
I think I should clarify what I consider to be the "Hobbes problem".
In rejecting private ownership of the means of production, I take the stand that it is theft of one person of what he has no right over, and therefore the common Nozickian argument for private ownership of the means of production does not hold. But, when considering how, practically, collective ownership of the means of production would work, I have reservations about the ability for sustained, long term collective ownership, where there are huge sacrifices that must be made through a democratic process. Maybe these worries are unfounded--but let's assume that they aren't. That leaves me with an attempt to justify the private ownership of the means of production, assuming a completely self-interested, selfish human being (it is an unrealistic assumption, but it would very much reinforce socialist arguments especially if we were able to justify collective ownership even if my worries turned out to be true).
So, let's consider my uncharitable reading of Hobbes (which I don't think is completely wrong). Assume an island with only 10 people, to keep things simple. One is very strong, intelligent, and able to overpower the other nine through force and making deals with two others. The other 7 can't agree among themselves. Call this guy George. George, becoming the sovereign, overpowers the others and now owns the means of production. As time goes by, George's sovereignty takes hold and he gains 50% of the surplus, while the rest is shared among the rest, with his two buddies gaining 30%. The seven don't revolt simply because George has caused division among them, as well as his two friends are his bodyguards with weapons.
But it seems, given the chance, one of the seven would get rid of George, or one of George's buddies, since there is a clear injustice with the distribution of the income, and it seems undesirable to live within a system where, even if George were the nicest of men, he owns the means of production forcefully (even if you were to say institutionally he does, in effect, it is through force, where the institutions are biased towards the owners). It is an undesirable state of affairs, and not within the interest of anyone to live under it.
Let's analyze that last sentence. Consider, for instance, a scenario where persons 4 to 10 were better off under a scheme where there were an owner, and he has such economic acumen that he arranges the mode of production to result in material gains that are far higher than if they were arranged in a democratic fashion. Yet, even if this were so, just because the owner is lucky to have that acumen, it still doesn't follow that the rest should settle for less. After all, they are the ones doing the work, and the owner is only arranging the system. There is still room for demanding collective ownership, while the economist's talents becomes a shared public good. If nothing else, then persons 4 to 10 can forcibly find ways to gain more, and surely persons 1 to 3 would rather not live in such insecurity and give into the demands. No one man can overpower the rest, and no set of oppressive institutions are invincible.
In this sense, then, it seems that even if we were to attempt to justify private ownership of the means of production using my reading of Hobbes, it would still make very little sense. I think if we dropped the overly risk averse assumption Hobbes makes, then it makes more sense, especially when considering the bare self-interest of individuals, to run things collectively, where talents are shared collectively.
(this is part of a discussion I had in another forum but I wonder what folks think here as well)
(in reply to Nozick, from Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality):
1. Nozick claims that anything acquired by just means is justly owned.
1b. There are no unjust consequences to things that follow (1).
2. Nozick goes on to say that taking something from someone who acquired said item is unjust.
2b. Private property is one such thing.
3. But (and here Cohen replies), clearly there are unlucky people who get the short end of the deal.
4. Said unlucky people are the victims of involuntary injustice.
5. In analyzing the origins of private property, then, there is no justice in how it was originally acquired.
6. When person A, for instance, has property X, he is depriving Y number of people to access to it.
7. Being deprived of access to property, something so valuable, is something clearly no reasonable person would do.
8. Therefore, person A is stealing from B number of people.
9. Private property, as opposed to collectively owned property, is therefore theft.
Now, on the surface, I think this seems to be an incredibly well thought out argument, and Nozick never replied to it. However, in practice, there seems to be problems with collective ownership of the means of production: it assumes that people will be able to get along, disregards jealously, and places too much faith into a democratic process. Or so the critics claim.
But the alternative, and (in my view) only way of justifying private ownership of the means of production, is to endorse Hobbes' approach. This approach goes, very roughly, as follows:
1. There is the state of nature that is undesirable.
2. People will fight, and only the strongest will win.
3. Since A is undeniably stronger than everyone else, everyone else will rationally allow A to do whatever he wishes in exchange for their own security.
4. Therefore, this is the origin of the "right" to private property.
But there are some problems with this account. First of all, the strongest aren't necessarily the ones owning the current property, unless the strongest is the state, in which case it is an incredibly charitable reading of Hobbes, since it isn't in the interest of the majority of the people to protect the interests of the minority. Furthermore, it doesn't explain why people don't actively seek to kill the owners of the means of the production, but rather are more focused on killing themselves. Donald Trump, or Rupert Murdoch, or the Koch brothers aren't subject to assassination attempts. Oddly enough, there is more crime among the poor, since they seem to be easier targets. This seems to paint a very grim picture of the state of things, particularly the institutions. After a while, who would stand for such a thing?
Yet, I can't help but think that this is a very strong argument, though not necessarily philosophically sound. At the very least, even Nozick wouldn't agree to this, since he takes (his) Kantian approach. But philosophy cannot just be an exercise in logic, but also have practical consequences. The alternative seems to be to put more faith in collective deliberation, which some may say is incredibly naive.
...
I think I should clarify what I consider to be the "Hobbes problem".
In rejecting private ownership of the means of production, I take the stand that it is theft of one person of what he has no right over, and therefore the common Nozickian argument for private ownership of the means of production does not hold. But, when considering how, practically, collective ownership of the means of production would work, I have reservations about the ability for sustained, long term collective ownership, where there are huge sacrifices that must be made through a democratic process. Maybe these worries are unfounded--but let's assume that they aren't. That leaves me with an attempt to justify the private ownership of the means of production, assuming a completely self-interested, selfish human being (it is an unrealistic assumption, but it would very much reinforce socialist arguments especially if we were able to justify collective ownership even if my worries turned out to be true).
So, let's consider my uncharitable reading of Hobbes (which I don't think is completely wrong). Assume an island with only 10 people, to keep things simple. One is very strong, intelligent, and able to overpower the other nine through force and making deals with two others. The other 7 can't agree among themselves. Call this guy George. George, becoming the sovereign, overpowers the others and now owns the means of production. As time goes by, George's sovereignty takes hold and he gains 50% of the surplus, while the rest is shared among the rest, with his two buddies gaining 30%. The seven don't revolt simply because George has caused division among them, as well as his two friends are his bodyguards with weapons.
But it seems, given the chance, one of the seven would get rid of George, or one of George's buddies, since there is a clear injustice with the distribution of the income, and it seems undesirable to live within a system where, even if George were the nicest of men, he owns the means of production forcefully (even if you were to say institutionally he does, in effect, it is through force, where the institutions are biased towards the owners). It is an undesirable state of affairs, and not within the interest of anyone to live under it.
Let's analyze that last sentence. Consider, for instance, a scenario where persons 4 to 10 were better off under a scheme where there were an owner, and he has such economic acumen that he arranges the mode of production to result in material gains that are far higher than if they were arranged in a democratic fashion. Yet, even if this were so, just because the owner is lucky to have that acumen, it still doesn't follow that the rest should settle for less. After all, they are the ones doing the work, and the owner is only arranging the system. There is still room for demanding collective ownership, while the economist's talents becomes a shared public good. If nothing else, then persons 4 to 10 can forcibly find ways to gain more, and surely persons 1 to 3 would rather not live in such insecurity and give into the demands. No one man can overpower the rest, and no set of oppressive institutions are invincible.
In this sense, then, it seems that even if we were to attempt to justify private ownership of the means of production using my reading of Hobbes, it would still make very little sense. I think if we dropped the overly risk averse assumption Hobbes makes, then it makes more sense, especially when considering the bare self-interest of individuals, to run things collectively, where talents are shared collectively.
(this is part of a discussion I had in another forum but I wonder what folks think here as well)